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Abstract 
 
Previous research has shown that meritocratic recruitment increases 
bureaucratic governance and decreases corruption (Evans and Rauch, 1999, 
2000). However, less emphasis has been made on why meritocratic practices 
take root. This paper aims to explore this scientific gap by testing two main 
hypotheses. Increased rates of tertiary enrolment in autocracies is proposed to 
have a negative effect on meritocratization (H1). This is suggested to occur as 
a growing educated class may directly compete with the ruling elites for power. 
Conversely, increasing rates tertiary enrolment is suggested to increase the 
likelihood of mertiocratization in democracies (H2). This mechanism is 
proposed, as democratic rulers are concerned about the provision of public 
goods. They are thereby willing to sacrifice their natural inclination toward 
favouring their core constituencies, as costs for retaining patronage networks 
increases with a growing educated class. Evidence was found for both H1 and 
H2 – autocracies display a significant negative relationship with 
mertiocratization as tertiary enrolment increases, while a significant positive 
relationship is found for democracies. The study was empirically executed 
using panel data, with measures of tertiary enrolment and meritocracy dating 
from 1820 to 2010 – which to date is the first time to be tested.  In addition, up 
to 108 countries were evaluated over the time period, using a variety of 
controls. This paper, thereby provides new evidence based on a larger 
collection of data than previous studies investigating the causes of 
mertiocratization. 
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1 Introduction 
Meritocracy may signal fairness in the process of recruitment, absorbing the 
most talented applicants into the public administration. However, meritocracy 
may not necessarily equate to merit reforms – many countries generally have 
merit laws but do not follow them in practice (Rothstein and Sorak, 2017: 41; 
Schuster, 2017). This paper therefore aims to investigate the adoption of merit 
in practice – not legal merit reforms.  
However, merit in practice entails costs for the ruling elite in autocracies, 
where rulers (and their children) may lose the advantages procured through 
networks of nepotism and political favouritism – as talented outsiders from the 
lower classes may take their jobs (Shefter, 1977, 1994; Sundell, 2013, 2014). 
This therefore creates a dilemma for the elites – where opening up the public 
administration to an increasingly educated work force, may directly increase 
competition with the political elite, and thus likely diminish its dominance over 
political affairs.  Increasing rates of tertiary enrolment in autocratic regimes, is 
therefore suggested to disincentivize the adoption of merit reforms.  
Conversely, the likelihood of merit in practice is proposed to increase among 
democracies: when the educated class grows, the political elite is compelled to 
meritocratize as the advantages of patronage networks loses its benefits 
(Hollyer, 2011a, 2011b). Thus, as the legitimacy of a democratic regime is 
dependent on the electoral support of its citizens – leaving out a growing 
educated class may be more costly for the ruling elite, which in turn increases 
pressures for adopting merit in practice.  
This paper thereby evaluates the diverging outcomes bureaucratic 
recruitment. And more particularly, why some bureaucracies recruit applicants 
based on their talents and merits, and why other bureaucracies rely on partial 
recruitment-channels based on networks of patronage and nepotism. These 
recruitment-patterns are related to the Weberian distinction; where public 
employees on one hand are recruited through merit-based practices, insulated 
from the ruling elite. And on the other hand, a politicized bureaucracy where 
public employees are partially selected through personal networks based on 
nepotism and patronage, accountable to the political elite (Weber, 1921/1978; 
Silberman, 1993). Yet, first of all, why is it relevant to have a meritocratic 
bureaucracy? 
Previous research has shown that meritocratic recruitment increases 
bureaucratic governance and decreases corruption (Evans and Rauch, 1999, 
2000). Bureaucracies adopting merit in practice may receive larger shares of 
investments, in comparison to bureaucracies with no meritocracy (Mauro, 
1995). Meritocratic recruitment may mitigate the likelihood of civil wars 
(Lapuente and Rothstein, 2014), increase democratic stability (Cornell and 
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Lapuete, 2014) and the legitimacy of the political system in place (Rothstein, 
2008). Bureaucracies recruiting applicants by merit may also explain why 
countries with vast natural resources can accumulate and invest recourses 
efficiently (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 
2006). Establishing meritocracy may have a profound effect on interpersonal 
trust, as there seem to be a causal relationship between trust in authorities 
(vertical trust) and inter-personal trust (horizontal trust). This implicates that 
when trust in authorities decreases, distrust will spread among the public 
themselves (Rothstein, 2001; Uslaner and Badescu, 2004; Ek and Rothstein 
2005; Rothstein and Teorell, 2008; Rothstein, 2011).  
In addition, having a meritocratic bureaucracy may impact a wide array of 
aspects associated with human well-being, such as environmental quality 
(Laegreid and Povitkina, 2018), natural disaster preparedness (Ahlbom and 
Povitkina, 2016), egalitarian values (Teigen and Wängerud, 2009; Rothstein, 
2016) and health (Holmberg and Rothstein, 2010; Halleröd et al., 2013). The 
absence of meritocracy, may thus bring about dire consequences for entire 
societies, crippling the delivery of public goods and services. It is therefore 
important to identify what causes the adoption of meritocracy from a scientific 
as well as a societal point of view. However, while the outcomes of 
meritocracy on governance has been established – less emphasis has been 
made on what incentivizes mertiocratization. This paper aims to explore this 
scientific gap, by investigating the effect of tertiary enrolment on 
mertiocratization over time.  
Previous papers have argued that higher rates of secondary enrolment 
increase the likelihood of meritocratization – as the political legitimacy for 
retaining existing patronage networks decreases with a growing educated 
population (Holliyer, 2011b, 2011a). Thus, the political elite is suggested to be 
pressured to meritocratize in order to maintain its political legitimacy. This 
paper complements previous research by introducing a novel theory: increased 
rates of tertiary enrolment, is suggested to disincentivize the political elite in 
autocratic regimes from adopting merit in practice, as it triggers increased 
competition between the already-established political elite on one side, and the 
educated populace on the other side – that have yet challenged the hegemony 
of the old guard.  In this context, the political elite is suggested to hold positions 
“with close proximity to power or policymaking [including] all elected 
representatives, executive officers of organisation and senior state employees” 
(Lilleker, 2003: 207).  
The above-stated mechanisms may thereby display two divergent patterns. 
First, democracies are more likely to show similar outcomes in accordance 
with previous research, where an increasingly educated class pressures the 
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political elite to introduce merit in practice, as keeping recruitment-procedures 
based on patronage weakens its political legitimacy (Hollyer, 2011a, 2011b). 
Second, in autocracies, increasing tertiary enrolment disincentivizes the ruling 
elite from introducing merit in practice, as it may directly increase competition 
with the ruling elite, and thus likely diminish its dominance over political 
affairs (Sundell, 2013, 2014; Shefter, 1977, 1994). Furthermore, access to 
public administration may be more dependent on the rate of completed tertiary 
enrolment rather than secondary enrolment. Tertiary enrolment is thereby 
evaluated instead of secondary enrolment, which was the basis of previous 
studies. However, the effects of secondary enrolment were controlled for, 
showing that the results hold for both levels of education (see Appendix V).  
Two main hypotheses are suggested: Increased rates of tertiary enrolment is 
proposed to have a negative effect on mertiocratization when interacted with 
autocratic regimes (H1). In addition, this paper evaluates whether democratic 
regimes increase the likelihood of mertiocratization with rising rates of tertiary 
enrolment (H2). Evidence was found for both H1 and H2 – increasing rates of 
tertiary enrolment shows negative and significant effects on meritocratization 
for autocratic regimes, whereas the effect of democratic regimes displays 
significant positive results on meritocratization. Thus, increasing rates of 
tertiary enrolment in democracies facilitate meritocratization, whereas rising 
rates of tertiary enrolment in autocracies, have a negative effect on 
meritocratization – further entrenching the ruling elites into their patronage 
networks.  
The study was empirically executed using panel data analysis with data on 
tertiary enrolment from 1820 to 2010, together with data measuring the 
impartiality of public administrations from 1789 to 2017 – which to date is the 
first time to be tested. In addition, up to 108 countries were evaluated for nearly 
two centuries using a variety of controls. This paper thereby provides results 
based on a larger collection of data than previous studies, investigating the 
causes of meritocratization. While previous studies evaluated the implications 
of secondary enrolment on meritocratization (Hollyer, 2011a, 2011b) – the 
requirements for formal recruitment may more likely correspond to tertiary 
education. The relationship between tertiary enrolment, merit adoption and 
political regimes over time is thereby introduced for the first time in this paper, 
investigating its implications on meritocratization for 190 years. This paper 
therefore brings forward new evidence in terms of conditions that may 
incentivize and disincentivize merit adoption, and contributes by finding 
evidence for the effect of tertiary enrolment in two ways. First, increasing rates 
of tertiary enrolment decreases the likelihood of mertiocratization – under 
autocratic rule. Second, increasing rates of tertiary enrolment increases the 
   7 
likelihood of merit adoption – under democratic rule. The following section 
reviews previous literature that suggests the above-stated mechanisms. 
 
2 Literature Review  
When the recruitment to the public administration is determined by the merits 
and talents of its applicants, it may significantly improve the deliverance of 
public goods. However, the causes of meritocratic recruitment have been rarely 
studied.  
It may for instance be intuitive to think that merit laws establish meritocracy. 
This is however rarely the case – merit laws rarely transpire into merit 
practices. For instance, Uganda has merit legislation, which according to the 
Swedish government agency SIDA is ‘close to perfection’ – although 
corruption is alarmingly high (Rothstein, 2018: 61-62).  The same may apply 
to Italy, where all its regions have shared the same legislation for over 150 
years. However, cross-variations between regions are extremely diverse in 
terms merit in practice. For instance, the farthest northern regions such as the 
Bolzano region, have levels of meritocracy on par with Denmark. While in 
contrast, its southern regions have ratings closer to Morocco and Nigeria 
(Charron et al., 2014; Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente, 2015b; Rothstein, 
2018). Practices of merit recruitment are in these examples thereby rarely 
related to the presence of merit laws (Rothstein and Sorak, 2017: 41; Schuster, 
2017). Another illustrative example is the comparison between the 
developments of the Dominican Republic and Paraguay, showing that the 
Dominican Republic, albeit having adopted merit reforms – fail to implement 
them in practice, whereas Paraguay in relative terms, succeeds to adopt merit 
in practice without any legislation. These indications of good governance in 
Paraguay, are suggested to arise from “fragmented control over bad 
government” (Schuster, 2016: 8), which may allow space for periodic practices 
of merit recruitment (Schuster, 2016, 2017). This paper therefore evaluates the 
likelihood of adopting merit in practice – not merit laws. But if laws often are 
unable to uphold merit in practice, then why have meritocratic recruitment 
managed to been established in some cases and not in others?   
Previous literature has identified certain factors that may facilitate the 
establishment of merit in practice. One main argument is that rising rates of 
secondary enrolment may put pressure on the political elite to meritocratize, 
as the costs of sustaining recruitment-channels based on patronage networks 
increases. The legitimacy of the ruling elite is thereby theorized to be 
undermined, if the elite continues to hold on to recruitment-procedures based 
on patronage and nepotism, as pressures for merit adoption increases with a 
growing educated class (Hollyer, 2011a, 2011b). However, competing views 
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exists whether increasing rates of secondary enrolment facilitates or obstructs 
merit in practice. In contrast, historical evidence shows that the nobilities in 
Europe agreed to adopt merit in practice, as long as they continued to hold on 
to power. This assumption is based on the nobilities’ disproportionate access 
to education during the 19th and early 20th century – indicating that merit 
adoption was incentive-compatible under conditions when higher educational 
enrolment was low (Sundell, 2013, 2014). These views seemingly contradict 
each other in their conclusions. However, what is missing from these previous 
studies is the impact of political regimes on mertiocratization as education 
enrolment increases. 
This paper suggests that the former argument holds for democracies 
(Hollyer, 2011b), as the legitimacy of democratic regimes is based on the 
support of the electorate, pressuring the political elite to make concessions 
when the middle class expands (Olson 1993, Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Hollyer, 
2011a, 2011b). The costs of keeping a growing middle class outside of the 
public administration, is thus assumed to be greater than holding on to 
recruitment-procedures based on patronage. The latter mechanism on the other 
hand, is suggested to be in accordance with how autocratic rulers operate 
(Sundell, 2013, 2014; Shefter 1977, 1994). In this case, opening up the public 
administration to an increasingly educated work force, may directly increase 
competition with the ruling elite in autocracies, and thus likely diminish its 
dominance over political affairs. The elites may thereby opt for informal 
recruitment channels, in order to block competitors from having access to the 
public administration through formal means, as the legitimacy of the ruling 
elite in autocracies are bounded by the loyalty of their supporters, upheld by 
networks of patronage and nepotism (Magaloni, 2006, 2008; Magaloni and 
Kricheli, 2010; Geddes, 2014). In this context, increasing educational equality 
between the ruling elite and the middle class, can be interpreted as the reason 
for social conflict rather than the solution for it – a conflict that the elite in 
autocracies are willing to take in order to maintain their hegemony. 
Conversely, meritocratization may be incentive-compatible if access to higher 
education is limited to the elite, as such change only generate competition 
among the elite themselves (Sundell, 2013, 2014; Shefter, 1977, 1994).  
The differential effect of education on merit recruitment when taking 
political regimes into account, may be explained by the divergent time 
horizons of the political elites in democracies and autocracies. Time horizon 
denotes the political elite’s future anticipation about the durability of the 
regime (Lapuente and Nistotskaya, 2009). Indications of a wide time horizon, 
and its effects on the decision-making of the political elite has been widely 
documented – it may be interpreted through respecting property and contract 
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rights (Clague et al. 1996; Dahlström and Lapuente, 2017), increased rates of 
domestic investments (Wright, 2008a), stabilizing the path to democracy 
(Wright and Escriba-Folch, 2011), increased aid effectiveness (Wright, 
2008b), less inclination toward nationalizing assets (Jensen, Malesky and 
Weymouth, 2014), and finally, an increased likelihood to adopt merit in 
practice (Lapuente and Nistotskaya, 2009). Yet, what causes a widened time 
horizon has often been limited to either ‘regime durability’ or the ‘probability 
of regime failure’, indicating a close relationship to elite survival (Clague et 
al., 1996, Przeworski et al, 2000). 
For instance, if the ruling elite is ensured that their position is consolidated, 
they will be incentivized to make long-term decisions, signifying a widened 
time horizon. Conversely, if the elite perceives its position to be severely 
threatened, it incentivizes a behavioural pattern based on a short-term 
rationale, indicating a short time horizon (Clague et al. 1996; Wright, 2008a, 
2008b, Lapuente and Nistotskaya, 2009; Wright and Escribá-Folch, 2011; 
Wilson and Wright, 2015). In general terms, democracies may therefore have 
an advantage over autocracies, as the legitimacy of democratic states relies on 
the support of the electorate (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008), whereas in autocracies, 
regime survival mainly relies on the support of a narrow group of regime 
loyalists (Magaloni, 2006, 2008).  
Another explanation for why merit in practice may take root is when the 
power-concentration is limited to a small circle of rulers. Consequently, public 
employees conceive their politicians as less credible in such a situation, which 
incentivizes the rulers to bridge this lack of trust and increase efficiency by 
professionalizing the public administration (Knott and Miller, 2006, 2008; 
Lapuente, 2010; cf. Dahlström et al. 2012).  This may well apply for autocratic 
regimes, where power frequently is concentrated to a few key-players. Thus, 
in terms of power-concentration, autocracies may be more incentivized to 
adopt merit in practice than democratic regimes. Autocratic rulers may thereby 
opt to delegate power by meritocratizing the public administration.  
Autocrats may also enjoy the advantage of making swift and efficient 
decisions, as they are comprised of fewer veto-players in comparison to 
democracies. In addition, the ruling elite does not need to take any opposition 
into consideration, as they are able to reconcile all existing contradictions 
through coercive force (Lapuente, 2007; D’Arcy, Ellis and Nistotskaya, 2015). 
Autocracies are thereby able to deal with issues associated with collective 
action problems – by enforcing collective order through the authority of an 
external agent (Hobbes, 1651/1997). Democracies on the other hand share the 
nature of a credible commitment problem. This is associated with the 
Montesquieuan thought of delivering welfare-enhancing goods, by ‘tying the 
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hands of the elite’, through a horizontal division of power between institutions, 
and a vertical division of power between citizens and incumbents 
(Montesquieu, 1748/1989). These two notions thereby point toward how an 
institutionalized democracy tend to provide public goods as a means of 
maintaining political legitimacy (Olson 1993, Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; 
Hollyer, 2011a, 2011b), and how autocracies may implement policies – despite 
opposition – thereby adopting merit in practice efficaciously if rulers decide it 
is a necessary measure. However, the decisiveness of autocratic rulers is a 
double-edged sword – it may also imply that autocrats could ignore demands 
for merit adoption if it threatens its existence. Democracies on the other hand, 
may not ignore such demands easily due to its institutional design, as the basis 
of its legitimacy relies on the provision of public goods.  
An additional important factor for facilitating merit adoption, is the 
establishment of an independent judiciary prior to merit reforms (Wilson, 
1887; Goodknow, 1900; Weber, 1921/1978). This is suggested to explain why 
Sweden managed to gradually reform its bureaucracy in the early 19th century, 
subsequently professionalizing the bureaucracy by 1875 (Rothstein, 2011a; 
2011b; Teorell, 2017: 215). Records show that court cases of bureaucratic 
malfeasance, ranging from milder cases of misconduct, embezzlement, third-
party abuse1 and forgery shaped the fight against corrupt practices. A 
significant prerequisite for the initiation of these reforms, is suggested to be 
the establishment of a well-functioning court-system (Rothstein and Teorell, 
2015a, 2015b). Similarly, the professionalization of the Prussian civil service, 
is assumed to be related to the establishment of an independent judiciary by 
1775 (Finer, 1997). First, the judiciary established a merit-system where each 
applicant had to pass two examinations.  Second, the rulings of the judiciary 
were protected from executive interference, and was given the authority to 
remove civil servants, through well-founded investigations (Finer 1932; Finer 
1997). Having executive constrains may therefore be decisive for 
professionalizing the bureaucracy as both cases illustrates. Furthermore, these 
cases show that ratifying reforms intended to professionalize the bureaucracy, 
rarely had any effect after being passed. In fact, merit in practice only surfaced 
after a long period of time – often after decades, sometimes over a century.  
The following section theorizes the causes for mertiocratization, by adding 
historical evidence that corresponds with the mechanisms discussed in this 
section. Two main hypotheses are then suggested following this discussion.   
 
                                               
1 Usually consisting of bribery cases or extortion involving third parties such as citizens. 
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3 Theory 
Building on the previous chapters, two main assumptions are held regarding 
the meritocratization of the public administration, and are derived into two 
main hypotheses. First, the acceptance of meritocratization is plausible if the 
continuation of elite dominance is ensured in autocratic regimes, as it widens 
the time horizon of the ruling elite, and in turn, incentivizes long-term 
investments for regime survival (Clague et al., 1996; Wright, 2008a, 2008b). 
Opening up the public administration to an increasingly educated population, 
may therefore directly increase competition with the political elite and thus 
diminish its dominance over political affairs. Increasing rates of tertiary 
enrolment is thereby hypothesized to disincentivize the adoption of merit 
reforms (Sundell, 2013. 2014; Shefter 1977; 1994).  
Furthermore, contesting views exists about the capacity of autocratic 
regimes to introduce merit in practice.  On one hand, autocrats may have 
advantages that facilitate the introduction of merit in practice more 
efficaciously than democracies. First, autocracies do not have to take any 
opposition into account when implementing policies (D’Arcy, Nistotskaya and 
Ellis, 2015).  Second, it may be more likely that such reforms are implemented 
in autocracies, as the decision-making power is concentrated to a small number 
of veto-players among autocratic regimes – indicating higher decisiveness 
(Lapuente, 2007). Third, autocracies may be incentivized to adopt merit 
reforms deriving from high power-concentrations, in order to decrease the 
divide between rulers and bureaucrats. Thus, ruling elites in autocracies may 
therefore introduce merit reforms as a means to alleviate credibility-related 
issues (Dahlström et al. 2012; Knott and Miller, 2006, 2008). This was for 
instance the case of Francisco Franco in Spain, who by the end of his rule 
introduced measures for meritocratizing the public administration (Lapuente, 
2007). The adoption of merit in practice may also have been incentivized as 
Spain by 1970 had a tertiary enrolment rate of 1.3%, which may have 
facilitated the shift toward meritocratization due to low rates of tertiary 
enrolment. 
 However, it is yet unclear whether these advantages among autocracies 
translates into a willingness to reform, as the legitimacy of the ruling elite in 
autocracies, are bounded by the loyalty of their supporters upheld by patronage 
networks (Magaloni, 2006, 2008; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010; Geddes, 
2014). The case of Iran shows that tertiary enrolment increased from 1.0% 
prior to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 to 6.3% in 1998, during the incumbency 
of reformist president Mohammad Khatami. From this period of time, merit in 
practice had significantly increased. However, the re-election of the former 
president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, led to wide protests from the young 
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Figure 1. The Development of Meritocracy and Tertiary Enrolment in Iran 
and educated middle class over claims of electoral fraud. The gains made to 
meritocratize the public administration soon deteriorated, as the ruling elite 
increased measures to avert pressures from the educated class (Milani, 2010; 
Tahmasebi-Birgani, 2010; Dabashi, 2011). Thus, when the political elite felt 
threatened, they did not hesitate to increase recruitment-procedures based on 
patronage and nepotism as strategy to hold on to power. The development of 
meritocracy and tertiary enrolment in Iran is presented below. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 displays the progression of meritocracy and tertiary enrolment over time in Iran. Merit in practice is displayed to have 
decreased significantly after the Iranian Revolution in 1979, as the new ruling elite secured their grip on power by establishing 
recruitment-procedures based on patronage and nepotism. However, the time horizon of the ruling elite widened as time 
passed, and by 1998 merit levels had increased slightly above ‘1’. These advances dropped to ‘0’ as widespread protest 
ensued after accusations of electoral fraud in 2009. Tertiary enrolment reached 14.4% by 2010. However, ratings of merit in 
practice were by 2010 lower than the meritocracy scores of 1941, when tertiary enrolment only counted to 0.1%.  
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Previous historical evidence on the professionalization of the public 
administration in Sweden (cf. Rothstein, 1998) and the United Kingdom (cf. 
Greenaway, 2004) – points out that the processes of merit adoption initiated in 
autocratic settings, are dependent on the continuation of elite dominance where 
the ruling elite have disproportionate access to education (Sundell, 2013, 2014; 
Shefter 1977, 1994). Thus, political elites in autocracies may meritocratize 
when tertiary enrolment rates are low, as competition will be limited among 
‘themselves’ – they have nothing to fear nor to lose from meritocratic 
recruitment, other than enhancing the bureaucratic apparatus. Conversely, 
when tertiary enrolment increases among the population, it may trigger a direct 
competition with the ruling elite and thus likely reduce their dominance over 
political affairs. Increasing rates of tertiary enrolment may therefore 
disincentivize the adoption of merit reforms, compelling the political elite to 
increasingly resort on informal channels for recruitment, using networks based 
on patronage.  
The second assumption propose that consolidated democracies tend to 
provide public goods based on a long-term rationale, which may pressure the 
political elite to make concessions to the general public when tertiary 
enrolment rates rise (Olson 1993, Keefer and Vlaicu 2008; Hollyer, 2011a, 
2011b). However, opposing views suggests that democratic regimes may be 
less likely to succeed with adopting merit reforms in practice. First, because 
they lack the coercive force to override opposition (D’Arcy, Nistotskaya and 
Ellis, 2015). Second, patronage may in some instances be more difficult to root 
out in democracies, where the survival of political parties is dependent on the 
appointment and loyalty of civil servants (Lapuente and Rothstein, 2014). 
Third, patronage is likely to be further exacerbated when competition among 
parties are high (Nistotskaya, and Lapuente, 2009; Hicken, 2011).  
On the other hand, historical research points out that the professionalization 
of the bureaucracy in United States may have been incentivized by increasing 
rates of tertiary enrolment (cf. Lewis, 2007). The professionalization of the 
bureaucracy took place in a partially democratic setting with executive 
constraints, where the rise in tertiary enrolment is suggested to have 
incentivized merit in practice (Holliyer, 2011a, 2011b). Thus, the political elite 
in a democratic setting may respond differently, by making concessions to the 
general public when tertiary enrolment rates rises (Olson 1993, Keefer and 
Vlaicu 2008; Hollyer, 2011a, 2011b). Increasing rates of tertiary enrolment in 
democracies, is thereby suggested to incentivize the adoption of merit in 
practice, as opportunity costs increases for retaining the existing patronage 
networks (Holliyer, 2011b). 
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Further historical evidence may explain why the ruling elites in autocracies 
and democracies have diverging motivations for adopting merit in practice. 
This may be illustrated by comparing the historical outcomes of Sweden and 
the United Kingdom as monarchical autocracies on one hand, and the United 
States as a democratic state on the other hand. The main professionalization of 
the Swedish bureaucracy can be dated back as far as 1789 and ending in 1875 
– lasting for almost a century (Rothstein, 1998; Teorell, 2017). As an effect, 
nepotism decreased in the late 19th century and onward – but without the 
nobility losing any of its influence – as it had disproportionate access to 
education. However, their numbers were diluted over the course of time as the 
central public administration expanded. It is therefore suggested the 
aristocracy’s acceptance of meritocratic recruitment, arose from the assurance 
of continued elite domination – by having exclusive access to higher education 
(Sundell, 2013, 2014; Shefter, 1977; 1994). In addition, the professionalization 
of the bureaucracy in the United Kingdom, is thought to have followed a 
similar process as in the Swedish case. 
The development toward a professionalized bureaucracy in the United 
Kingdom, is suggested to have started from the Northcote/Trevelyan report 
(1854). However, it was not until Premier Gladstone’s (1870) Order-in-
Council for competitive examinations that a turning point could be observed, 
which was progressively followed up by several legislations over time2 
(Silberman, 1993: 401; Greenaway, 2004: 2-3). The primary aim of the reform 
was to avoid class conflict – tasks were divided between clerks who were 
assigned routine-tasks (sons of the middle class) and mandarins, representing 
the intellectual class (sons of the aristocracy). The latter group like in the 
Swedish case, had disproportionate access to prestige universities such as 
Oxford and Cambridge. Progress however accelerated in wartimes, especially 
during the world wars, which opened up recruitment outside of the nobility- 
circles (Butler, 1993; Greenaway, 2004; Horton, 2006; Cline, 2008). Thus, the 
professionalization of the Swedish and British bureaucracies is characterized 
by a continued process of merit reforms – initiated when tertiary enrolment 
rates were low in a non-democratic setting. This thereby allowed for the 
improvement of merit in practice over time, as such reforms and practices were 
tolerated by the aristocracy. 
In contrast, the political elite in the United States did not attempt to tie the 
civil service to universities. Conversely, bureaucratic recruitment was accessed 
through practical examinations, where common school education was 
                                               
2 Such as the Playfair Committee (1874-75), the Ridley Commission (1886-90), the 
MacDonnell Comission (1912-15) and the Haldane Committee on the Machinery of 
Government (1917-18) (Pyper and Burnham, 2011: 199-200). 
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conceived as satisfactory (Hoogenboom, 1959: 312-313). Civil servants were 
in turn the basis of a patronage system, which became increasingly costly as 
federal services expanded by the end of the 19th century. The first initiated 
merit reform, named the Pendleton act (1883), was designed in order to gain 
sufficient support from high-ranking federal officials. This was executed by 
leaving high federal positions untouched and by making the process of 
removing patronage networks gradual – ensuring that the elite would not be 
affected by these changes (Johnson and Liebecap, 1994: 29). This change of 
labour arrangements, was manifested through the division of ‘classified’ 
(merited) personnel and ‘unclassified’ (political appointed) personnel (Ibid: 
32). By 1905, half of all federal civil servants were recruited by merit. 
However, few states had adopted merit laws. This changed with the Great 
Depression, forcing a majority of the states to adopt merit laws in order to raise 
bureaucratic efficiency – as the federal states were facing a legitimacy crisis. 
Hence, by the mid 1930s, most federal states had adopted merit laws, which 
laid the foundation for a professional bureaucracy in the United States 
(Camões and Ruhil, 2003).  
The dissimilar process of bureaucratic professionalization between the 
United States on one side, and Sweden and the United Kingdom on the other 
side, may have been caused by the absence of an entrenched class-system 
dominated by the aristocracy in the United States – as was the case in Sweden 
and Victorian England. Thus, attempts to introduce merit in practice occurred 
when Sweden and the United Kingdom were ruled as Monarchical 
Autocracies. Merit reforms in Sweden and the United Kingdom were passed 
when tertiary enrolment rates were lower than 0.0%, and as both states had 
established a meritocratic recruitment, tertiary enrolment only reached 0.1% 
for Sweden and 0.2% for the United Kingdom. The incentives for adopting 
merit in practice may herein lie in the fact that the ruling elite found no 
competition from the lower classes, and thus opted to meritocratize in order to 
increase bureaucratic efficiency. However, the United States had passed its 
first merit reforms in a democratic setting. Tertiary enrolment reached 0.9% in 
1883 when the Pendleton Act was ratified, with further merit reforms being 
passed in most states by 1935, as tertiary enrolment had reached 4.8%. 
Furthermore, improvements in merit in practice is only observed as tertiary 
enrolment passes 9.0% by 1960. The historical progression of bureaucratic 
recruitment in the United States, thereby showcases how rulers in a democratic 
setting operate when tertiary enrolment rates increase – by gradually providing 
merit in practice as a public good in order to maintain their political legitimacy. 
The development of meritocracy and tertiary enrolment for these three cases 
are illustrated on the following two pages.  
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Figure 2. The Development of Meritocracy and Tertiary Enrolment in Sweden 
Figure 3. The Development of Meritocracy and Tertiary Enrolment in the United Kingdom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 and Figure 3 describe the progression of tertiary enrolment and meritocracy over time for Sweden and the United 
Kingdom. Merit reforms were according to the literature initiated in 1809 for Sweden (Rothstein, 1998) and 1853 for the 
United Kingdom (Pyper and Burnham, 2011). These figures illustrate that first, reforms did not lead to merit in practice 
immediately. In addition, merit reforms were initiated while tertiary enrolment rates were low in the United Kingdom (<0.0%) 
and Sweden (<0.0%), which may have incentivized the political elites to adopt merit in practice as the rulers were not 
threatened by an increasing educated class from the ‘outside’. Tertiary enrolment had by 1875 only reached 0.1% for both 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, coinciding with significant increases in meritocratic recruitment.  
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Figure 5. The Development of Merit in Practice over Time: 1789 – 2017 (SWE, US, UK) 
Figure 4. The Development of Meritocracy and Tertiary Enrolment in the United States 
Figure 4 describes the progression of tertiary enrolment and meritocracy over time in the United States. Merit reforms 
were according to the literature initiated in 1883 with the Pendleton Act (Theriault, 2003). United States, in comparison 
to the other two cases, had significant increases in tertiary enrolment (0.9%) when merit reforms were introduced. By 
1935 enrolment rates reached 4.8%, which may have further pressured the political elites among the federal states to 
adopt merit laws. However, significant increases in merit in practice may only be observed by 1960, when tertiary 
enrolment had reached 9.0% Figure 5, illustrates the incremental progression of merit in practice for all three countries 
cases 
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Democratic rulers may thereby end up adopting merit in practice with 
increasing rates of tertiary enrolment, as they are concerned about the 
provision of public goods, and thus provides merit in practice as a form of 
public good. This means that the political elites are willing to sacrifice their 
natural inclination toward favouring their core constituencies. Conversely, the 
institutionalized design of autocratic regimes, inherently set the time horizon 
of the rulers shorter than in democracies, as the legitimacy of the regime is 
held up by a minority of loyalties supporting their survival. Autocratic rulers 
are thereby not incentivized to provide public goods to the general public, and 
thus remain protective of their recruitment-channels based on networks of 
patronage and nepotism. 
From this discussion above, two main hypotheses are suggested: 
 
H1: Democratic regimes, when interacting with higher 
rates of tertiary enrolment, increases the likelihood of 
merit in practice (moderating effect). 
 
H2: Autocratic regimes, when interacting with higher 
rates of tertiary enrolment, decreases the likelihood of 
merit in practice (moderating effect). 
 
H0: No support is found for H1 and H2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In order to establish whether either of these two hypotheses have any bearing, 
a statistical analysis is executed using panel data. Selection of data and the 
details about the methodological approach are discussed in the following 
chapter. 
Tertiary Enrolment 
Operationalization of H1 and H2 
 
Meritocracy 
Democracy 
+ 
 
H1 
Autocracy 
- 
 
H2 
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Correlation between Variables Associated with Meritocracy 
 
The Rigorous and Impartial Public Administration variable from the V-Dem Country Year Data set (2018), was correlated with data 
from the Quality of Government Expert survey (2015), using survey question q2_a (indicating meritocracy) and q7 (indicating 
impartiality). In addition, the ICRG indicator of Quality of Government was included from the Quality of Government Time-Series Data 
set (2018). The overall correlations with the V-Dem measure show high empirical significance. 
 
 
4 Data and Methodology 
Data is derived from three main sources: the V-Dem Country-Year database 
(2018) with temporal data ranging from 1789 to 2017, the Polity IV Annual 
Time-Series (2017) with data on political regime characteristics and transitions 
from 1800 to 2017, and lastly Lee and Lee’s Long-Run Education Dataset 
(2016) with data on educational enrolment from 1820 to 2010. In total, 108 
countries were at most matched between the tertiary enrolment and merit in 
practice measures.  
One dependent variable was used – namely the Rigorous and Impartial 
Public Administration, which is drawn from the V-Dem Country-Year 
Database (Coppedge et al., 2018: 157). The V-Dem Country-Year database 
builds its data with the help of 3000 country experts, with a minimum of six to 
seven coders for each variable. The coders were asked on a 0-4 scale: “Are 
public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?” – 
with higher numbers implying being more impartial. While impartiality is 
well-connected to fairness and quality of government in theory (cf. Rothstein 
and Teorell, 2008), it may not directly translate into meritocratic recruitment. 
A correlation was run over several variables linked to meritocratic recruitment, 
showing that the variable has an empirically strong correlation to meritocracy. 
One measurement for meritocratic recruitment is taken from the questionnaire 
‘q2_a’ from the QoG Expert Survey (2015), and is stated as: “When recruiting 
public sector employees, the skills and merits of the applicants decide who gets 
the job” (Dahlström et al., 2015: 8). Albeit the correlation shows high 
significance (r = 0.699), the relationship only displays the correlation at one 
point in time, and thus additional variables were correlated with the suggested 
V-Dem measure for meritocracy. 
The full correlations table is displayed on the below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Rigorous and Impartial  
Public Administration 
 
Impartiality (QoG  
Exp. Survey, 2015) 
 
Meritocracy (QoG  
Exp. Survey, 2015) 
 
ICRG Indicator of  
Quality of Government 
Rigorous and Impartial 
Public Administration 
1.000    
Impartiality (QoG Exp. 
Survey, 2015) 
0.729 1.000   
Meritocracy (QoG Exp. 
Survey, 2015) 
0.699 0.848 1.000  
ICRG Indicator of 
Quality of Government 
0.799 0.808 0.777 1.000 
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In addition, the V-Dem measure also shows high empirical correlation with the 
(ICRG) Indicator of Quality of Government3 (Teorell et al., 2018: 319), 
composed of the mean of three variables measured as ‘Corruption’, ‘Law and 
Order’ and ‘Bureaucratic Quality’ (r = 0.799) – signifying an overall close 
relationship with the concept of Quality of Government. Given the empirical 
evidence, the V-Dem measure is estimated as an adequate proxy for 
meritocratic recruitment. 
Nevertheless, while the V-Dem proxy for meritocracy brings about great 
opportunities for temporal research, it also carries problems. First, the country 
experts are unknown to the users, with no description of the field of expertise 
that the coders may hold. Second, coding data stretching back as far as over 
200 years ago, will be less accurate the longer you go back in time as sources 
and evidence of such practices will be scarcer – giving rise to validity 
problems. On the other hand, this way of coding temporal data is the only 
possible way, making the benefits outweigh its costs.  
Two main independent variables were employed. The first independent 
variable is the ‘Tertiary Enrolment (%)’4, provided by Lee and Lee’s Long-
Run Education Data set (2016). The dataset ranges from 1820 to 2010, making 
it a suitable measure for analyses over time. The educational measurement is 
registered in five-year intervals and was linearly interpolated in order to make 
the data fit with other measurements. However, one issue is whether the 
quantity of education reflects the quality. On one hand, the research questions 
are primarily focused on how access to public administration regulates the 
behaviour of the political elite. On the other hand, the quality of education may 
influence the professionalism of the employees, and in turn affect impartiality 
ratings. Using a variety of control variables is therefore necessary in order to 
account for such an issue. These controls are discussed further below.  
The second main independent variable denotes the political regime. Three 
political regime measurements were employed: The Democracy (BMR) from 
the V-Dem Country Year Data set, together with the Institutionalized 
Democracy and Institutionalized Autocracy measures from the Polity IV Data 
set. First, Democracy (BMR), is a “dichotomous democracy measure based on 
contestation and participation. Countries coded as democratic have (1) political 
leaders that are chosen through free and fair elections and (2) a minimal level 
of suffrage” (Coppedge et al., 2018: 288). Countries that pass these minimal 
requirements are hence coded as ‘1’. This paper interprets countries coded as 
                                               
3 The ICRG Indicator of Quality of Government runs from 1984-2017, with a total of 4,083 
observations. The QoG Expert Survey measurements only run for 2015, and include 124 
observations for the Meritocracy measure, and 121 observations for the Impartiality measure.   
4 More specifically, tertiary enrolment is counted in completed rates of tertiary enrolment.  
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‘0’ as non-democracies, with an inclination toward autocratic rule. Thus, for 
analytical facilitation, countries coded as ‘0’ are denoted as autocracies, albeit 
there may be a high degree of variation in terms of regime type characteristics. 
Second, Institutionalized Democracy is an additive eleven-point scale (0-10) 
based on: “[First], the presence of institutions and procedures through which 
citizens can express effective preferences about alternative policies and 
leaders. Second, the existence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise 
of power by the executive. Third, the guarantee of civil liberties to all citizens 
in their daily lives and in acts of political participation” (Marshall, Gurr and 
Jaggers, 2017: 14). Hence, instead of applying a classical categorization (cf. 
Sartori, 1970, 1991), democracy is interpreted as a continuous measurement 
using three weights, indicating the existence or absence of political 
participation, executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive – 
with no necessary minimal requirements for democracy. Third, 
Institutionalized Autocracy similarly employs an additive eleven-point scale 
(0-10): “derived from codings of the competitiveness of political participation, 
the regulation of participation, the openness and competitiveness of executive 
recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive (Marshall, Gurr and 
Jaggers, 2017: 16). This measurement follows the same logic as the 
Institutionalized Democracy variable, without having any categories in 
common. Therefore, these two measurements, albeit similar in their structure, 
function as entirely separate measurements.  
The use of dummy variables vis-á-vis continuous measurements have 
certain advantages and disadvantages. Including a dummy variable such as 
Democracy (BMR), has the advantage of facilitating the analysis of the 
empirical results – the effect of democracies and non-democracies are clearly 
detected as ‘1’ and ‘0’. However, it may also lead to a loss of information, 
which may consequently overfit the model at hand. Hence, using a continuous 
point-scale measurement may complement and increase the complexity in the 
analysis, but leaves doubt to whether a state may pass as a democracy. In 
addition, the effect of autocracies and democracies may not be clearly detected, 
as the significance for each category may be potentially exhausted by having 
fewer observations per point on the scale. Thus, the advantages of using a 
dummy variable in a panel data analysis is the clear outcomes in terms of 
regime categories, which serves this study well. The main emphasis is 
therefore put on interpreting the results from the Democracy (BMR) dummy 
variable, leaving the continuous eleven-point-scale (0-10) variables as 
complementary measurements for testing the hypotheses at hand.  
All controls are motivated by previous research and theories presented in the 
earlier sections of this paper. First, the time horizons of political elites have 
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previously been related to ensuring property rights (Olson, 1993; Clague et al., 
1996). A measurement for property rights is therefore included, deriving from 
the V-Dem Country Year Database and uses an interval measure, ranging from 
0-1, with higher rates indicating: “the right to acquire, possess, inherit and sell 
private property, including land” (Coppedge et al., 2018: 237). Second, the 
establishment of an independent judiciary was crucial for the 
professionalization process of the Swedish and Prussian bureaucracies (cf. 
Finer, 1933; Finer 1997; Teorell and Rothstein 2015a, 2015b; Teorell, 2017). 
Two controls were employed in order to cover for the existence of an 
independent judiciary, namely ‘Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment’ 
and ‘Executive Constraints’. The Executive Constraints control is taken from 
the Polity IV Data Set, and uses a point-scale ranging from 1-7, where ‘1’ 
denotes the absence of constraints on the executive branch, while ‘7’ denotes 
the subordination of the executive branch, implying that horizontal 
accountability is well institutionalized (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2017: 62). 
This variable is interpreted as a proxy for an independent judiciary. In addition, 
the Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment is included as a control with 
similar qualities to the Executive Constraints variable. This variable replaced 
the Executive Constraints measure, as it had a very high correlation (r > 0.7) 
with the continuous democracy and autocracy variables. 
The Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment: “refers to the extent to 
which a state [irrespective of regime type] has institutionalized procedures for 
transferring executive power” (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2017: 20-21), and 
is divided into three categories: ‘Unregulated’, ‘Transitional’ and ‘Regulated’. 
In an unregulated state, the appointment of the chief executive occurs through 
irregular seizures of power, whereas in transitional states, it occurs through 
closed appointments within political elite circles. However, in a regulated 
state, the procedure is institutionalized when appointments of the chief 
executive occur in a predictable manner such as competitive elections or 
hereditary succession (Ibid). Thus, states with a regulated appointment of the 
chief executive, indicate that a routinized and matured form of governance has 
been established and may thereby reflect when political elites have a widened 
time horizon, as well as providing evidence for institutional checks similar to 
the establishment of an independent judiciary (cf. Finer 1997; Teorell, 2017). 
This variable was recoded as a dummy variable, where instances of regulation 
was coded as ‘1’.  
Third, GDP/capita is derived from the V-Dem Country Year Database. The 
usage of GDP/capita, may facilitate the understanding of how economic 
growth impact meritocratization, while additionally control for how increased 
wealth and education effects meritocratization. Lastly, GDP/capita may have 
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a significant role in affecting the time horizon of the ruling elite, as well as 
controlling for whether pressure for meritocratization increases with increasing 
rates of GDP/capita. The inclusion of GDP/capita, removed eight further 
countries when added with the other controls. The construction of the models, 
takes the exclusion of such cases into consideration by incrementally adding 
each control variable at the time. In addition, combinations of the control 
variables are tested. Finally, all controls are included in the last model in order 
to test for a full combined effect. Furthermore, the restricted variety of control 
variables, is an issue of limited availability, combined with the requirement of 
being related to the theories and hypotheses presented in this paper. The 
models are therefore parsimoniously constructed in order to correspond with 
the availability of data. The controls may hence not cover all possible 
variations, possibly leading to the issue of omitted variable-biases. The results 
will therefore be interpreted with caution to this fact. A detailed summary of 
the collected data is presented below.  
 
 
 
Summary Statistics 
The Rigorous and Impartial Public Administration variable, from the V-Dem Country Year Data set (2018) is the main dependent variable and is in 
this paper referred to as the V-Dem Proxy for Meritocracy. Two types of independent variables were employed: First, Tertiary Enrolment (%). 
Second, two democracy variables are used, whereas one is a dummy variable: the Democracy (BMR). The second, Institutionalized Democracy, 
is a continuous measure, using an eleven-point scale (0-10). In total, four controls are employed: GDP/capita log, Property Rights, Executive 
Constraints and Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment. However, only three controls are used for each model: GDP/capita log, Property Rights, 
Executive Constraints – for Democracy (BMR). The second arrangement of controls includes GDP/capita, log, Property Rights and Regulation of 
Chief Executive Recruitment – for the Institutionalized Democracy and Institutionalized Autocracy variables.  
 
 
Variable 
 
Data Source 
 
Years Included 
 
Obs 
 
Mean 
 
Std. Dev. 
 
Min 
 
Max 
Rigorous and Impartial 
Public Administration 
 
V-Dem (2018) 
Country Year Data set 
1789-2017 24522 -.014 1.448 -3.533 4.623 
Tertiary Enrolment (%) 
 
Lee and Lee Long Run Data set 
(2016) 
 
1820-2010 15443 2.047 4.159 0 33.6 
Democracy (BMR) V-Dem (2018) Country Year 
Data set 
 
1789-2017 15979 .328 .47 0 1 
Institutionalized Democracy 
 
Polity IV Data set (2017) 1800-2017 16603 3.566 3.9 0 10 
Institutionalized Autocracy 
 
Polity IV Data set (2017) 1800-2017 16603 4.061 3.526 0 10 
GDP/capita, log V-Dem (2018) 
Country Year Data set 
 
1789-2017 12711 8.251 1.124 5.595 12.305 
Property Rights V-Dem (2018) 
Country Year Data set 
 
1789-2017 24840 .445 .283 .002 .953 
Executive Constraints 
 
Polity IV Data set (2017) 1800-2017 16603 3.806 2.407 1 7 
Regulation of Chief 
Executive Recruitment 
 
Polity IV Data set (2017) 1800-2017 16603 .565 .496 0 1 
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One noteworthy observation is the prevalence of unequal sample sizes, which 
may bring about unequal variances. Unequal variances in turn may affect the 
statistical power of the models, leading to confounding biases where 
parameters are either over- or underestimated. However, the amount of 
observations are large enough to avoid the greater consequences of these issues 
at hand, as the lowest sample amount to 12711 observations. This issue will 
also be taken into consideration during the interpretation of the final results.  
As this paper sets out to explore the propensity of meritocratization over 
time, long-run effects are calculated using panel data analysis. Furthermore, 
due to the nature of the data being country-coded over time, measured in years, 
a fixed effects model was opted for while successfully passing the Hausman 
test. In addition, due to the time-format of the data; there will be a risk for 
autocorrelation, occurring as a consequence of correlated residuals over time, 
which in turn may amplify the results. In order to check for autocorrelation, 
the Wooldridge test was executed and successfully passed. However, the 
problem of autocorrelation may for unforeseen events still affect the results 
and should therefore be considered. Lastly, the models have passed all standard 
regression diagnostics.  
Based on the collected data three main model are used, covering the effect 
of tertiary enrolment on meritocratization, using a linear fixed effects model. 
These main models are tested using the ‘V-Dem Proxy for Meritocracy’ for 
years overlapping tertiary enrolment (1820-2010).  
The models are outlined as follows below and are denoted as Linear Fixed 
Effect Model 1-3: 
 	"#$ = 	&' +	&)*+,-./,0	12,345+2-#$ + &67+538,/80	(:;<)#$ + &>*+,-./,0	12,345+2-#$ ×7+538,/80	(:;<)#$	 + &@A7B/8/D.-/#$	 + 	&EB,3D+,-0	<.Fℎ-H#$ + &I1J+8K-.L+	M32H-,/.2-H#$ + N			(1) 
 "#$ = 	&' +	&)*+,-./,0	12,345+2-#$ + &6O2H-.-K-.32/4.P+Q	7+538,/80#$ + &>*+,-./,0	12,345+2-#$ ×O2H-.-K-.32/4.P+Q	7+538,/80#$	 + &@A7B/8/D.-/#$	 + 	&EB,3D+,-0	<.Fℎ-H#$ +&I<+FK4/-.32	3R	Mℎ.+R	1J+8K-.L+	<+8,K.-5+2-#$ + N			(2) 
 "#$ = 	&' +	&)*+,-./,0	12,345+2-#$ + &6O2H-.-K-.32/4.P+Q	SK-38,/80 + &>*+,-./,0	12,345+2-#$ ×O2H-.-K-.32/4.P+Q	SK-38,/80 + &@A7B/8/D.-/#$	 + 	&EB,3D+,-0	<.Fℎ-H#$ +&I<+FK4/-.32	3R	Mℎ.+R	1J+8K-.L+	<+8,K.-5+2-#$ + N			(3) 
 
The variables are incrementally added, starting with the main focal 
relationship until reaching a full model in the final column. Thus, all three 
models presented above, corresponds to the final column for each table where 
all variables are included. In regards of modelling the regime types; Model 1, 
includes the Democracy (BMR) variable and is presented in Table 1; Model 2 
uses the continuous Democracy variable and is presented in Table 2, and lastly, 
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Model 3 uses the continuous Autocracy variable and is presented in Table 3. 
The following section presents the results.  
 
5 Results 
The results from the panel data analysis, using fixed effects regressions are 
presented in this section. The results in total consists of three tables, using 
linear fixed effects regression. Table 1 evaluates the effect of tertiary 
enrolment on mertiocratization and includes the moderating effect of 
Democracy (BMR). Table 2 evaluates the effect of tertiary enrolment on 
meritocratization together with the moderating effect of Institutionalized 
Democracy. In addition, Table 3 evaluates the effect of tertiary enrolment on 
meritocratization, including the moderate effect of Institutionalized Autocracy. 
All tables presented, consist of eleven models with an identical build-up on the 
independent variable-side. Model 1, displays the effect of tertiary enrolment 
on meritocratization. Model 2, adds the political regime measure without 
including tertiary enrolment. Model 3, adds the tertiary enrolment and political 
regime variables together. Model 4, adds the interaction effect between the 
political regime variable and tertiary enrolment. The structure for Model 4 is 
retained for all subsequent models, which adds the control variables. Model 5-
7 adds each control variable independently, checking for the individual effect 
of each control. In Model 8-10, two of the control variables are added in 
combinations in order to check for more complex effects. Lastly, the full model 
for all tables are presented in Model 11. This modelling structure, facilitates 
the comparison and evaluation of the effects on meritocratization, while 
incrementally increasing the complexity until reaching a full model in the 
eleventh numbered column.  
The remaining part of this section is structured as follows: First, results for 
Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 are presented together with the respective models, 
where independent variables and control variables are added until reaching a 
full model in the last column.  
Table 1 (see p. 31) displays the results from the Linear Fixed Effects Model 
(1), evaluating the effect of tertiary enrolment on meritocratization. Model 1 
illustrates the individual effect of tertiary enrolment, which shows a positive 
and significant effect on meritocratization. Model 2, removes the Tertiary 
Enrolment (%) variable and replaces it with the Democracy (BMR) dummy, 
showing that democratic regimes have a significant and positive effect on 
meritocratization, while the autocratic reference category shows a significant 
negative relationship with meritocratization. Adding Tertiary Enrolment (%) 
together with Democracy (BMR) in Model 3, shows positive effects for both 
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democratic and autocratic regimes with a consistent stronger coefficient 
among democracies. Model 4, adds the interaction effect between the 
Democracy (BMR) dummy variable and Tertiary Enrolment (%). Here, the 
effect between democracies and autocracies show a diverging trend: 
Democracies display a positive effect on meritocratization when tertiary 
enrolment rates increases, while the effect of autocracies goes in the opposite 
direction.  However, the marginal effects of autocracies surpass the zero-
threshold as tertiary enrolment increases past 15%, making the results 
insignificant. 
Figures for these trends are presented on the two following pages.  
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The top figure illustrates the linear prediction of Model 2 in Table 1, where the individual effect of the 
Democracy (BMR) dummy is estimated on meritocratization. Democracies have a positive effect on 
meritocratzation Conversely, autocracies show a slight negative effect. The results show high 
significance (p<0.01). The figure below illustrates the linear prediction of Model 10 in Table 1, which 
includes an interaction effect between Tertiary Enrolment (%) and Democracy (BMR), together with the 
Property Rights and Executive Constraints controls. In comparison to Model 2 – Model 10 illustrates 
that the negative effect and significance for autocracies increases, whereas the positive effect for 
democracies, albeit diminished, still retains its significance.  
         Linear Prediction of Model 2 and Model 10 
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Linear prediction of Model 3, where Tertiary Enrolment (%) and the Democracy (BMR) dummy is 
estimated on meritocratization. Both regimes show positive trends, albeit autocracies have a consistent 
weaker strength than democracies. Significance remains high (p<0.01). 
          Model 3 – Linear Prediction of Tertiary Enrolment (%) on Meritocratization 
 
The divergence between democracies and autocracies starts to show in Model 4, where the interaction 
effect between Democracy (BMR) and Tertiary Enrolment (%) make democracies have a positive effect 
on meritocratzation, while conversely, autocracies have a negative effect. The negative impact of 
autocracies with rising tertiary enrolment rates is however yet insignificant past 15% tertiary enrolment.  
          Model 4 – Linear Prediction of Tertiary Enrolment (%) on Meritocratization 
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In Model 7, the divergence between democracies and autocracies increases and shows high 
significance (p<0.01), as the Property Rights control is added to the interaction effect between 
Democracy (BMR) and Tertiary Enrolment (%).  
          Model 7 – Linear Prediction of Tertiary Enrolment on Meritocratization 
 
 
Model 5-7, adds the control variables individually. When controls are added, 
the divergent effects of democracies and autocracies increases as tertiary 
enrolment figures rises. Significant results are found in Model 7, which adds 
the Property Rights control to the interaction effect between Democracy 
(BMR) and Tertiary Enrolment (%). The results show empirically significant 
results (p<0.01) – albeit in opposite directions for democracies and autocracies. 
Democracies are inclined toward increased merit in practice when tertiary 
enrolment rates increase. Conversely, the effect is negative for autocracies, as 
the propensity for merit adoption decreases with higher rates of tertiary 
enrolment.  
Model 8-10, includes a combination of the control variables while retaining 
the interaction effect between Democracy (BMR) and Tertiary Enrolment (%). 
Model 10, which included Executive Constraints and Property Rights control, 
yielded the highest significance (p<0.01) among these combinations of 
controls, as the effect of democracies and autocracies continue to diverge with 
increasing rates of tertiary enrolment. Model 11, includes all variables and 
maintain high significance for democracies (p<0.01) and autocracies (p<0.05). 
The divergent trend between democratic and autocratic regimes remains, albeit 
weakened.  
The marginal effects for Model 7, Model 10 and Model 11 are presented 
below and is followed with the presentation of Table 1 on the subsequent page. 
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In Model 10, the divergence between democracies and autocracies increases further and is highly 
significant (p<0.01), as a combination of controls – Property Rights and Executive Constraints – are 
added to the interaction effect between Democracy (BMR) and Tertiary Enrolment (%).  
          Model 10 – Linear Prediction of Tertiary Enrolment on Meritocratization 
 
 
In Model 11, the divergence between democracies and autocracies remains significant, as all controls 
added to the interaction effect between Democracy (BMR) and Tertiary Enrolment (%). The diminishing 
effect of democracies and the increased effect among autocracies, may however have been 
augmented by the loss of observations. 
          Model 11 – Linear Prediction of Tertiary Enrolment on Meritocratization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   31 
Table 1 – The Effect of Tertiary Enrolment on Meritocratization 
 
 
Table 1 uses Democracy (BMR) as a political regime variable, where the reference category denotes autocratic regimes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 V-Dem Proxy for Meritocracy 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
            
Tertiary Enrolment (%) 0.0800***  0.0488*** -0.0154 -0.0537* -0.0306* -0.0482*** -0.0669** -0.0548* -0.0555*** -0.0652** 
 (0.00959)  (0.00950) (0.0168) (0.0296) (0.0164) (0.0178) (0.0282) (0.0284) (0.0172) (0.0275) 
Democracy  1.233*** 1.004*** 0.894*** 0.736*** 0.425*** 0.542*** 0.284* 0.488*** 0.193 0.160 
  (0.131) (0.108) (0.114) (0.124) (0.130) (0.118) (0.146) (0.125) (0.129) (0.138) 
Democracy × Tertiary Enrolment (%)    0.0744*** 0.0838*** 0.0876*** 0.0881*** 0.0958*** 0.0798*** 0.0964*** 0.0900*** 
    (0.0186) (0.0280) (0.0182) (0.0184) (0.0263) (0.0268) (0.0182) (0.0256) 
GDP/capita, log     0.209**   0.213** 0.115  0.133 
     (0.0908)   (0.0917) (0.0914)  (0.0936) 
Executive Constraints      0.146***  0.137***  0.122*** 0.110*** 
      (0.0308)  (0.0346)  (0.0280) (0.0323) 
Property Rights       1.734***  1.585*** 1.526*** 1.336*** 
       (0.370)  (0.407) (0.352) (0.380) 
Constant -0.00281 -0.288*** -0.283*** -0.216*** -1.674** -0.640*** -0.992*** -2.115*** -1.708** -1.262*** -2.059*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0445) (0.0507) (0.0541) (0.731) (0.107) (0.186) (0.727) (0.710) (0.186) (0.707) 
            
Observations 13,348 15,410 10,137 10,137 8,189 9,687 10,137 7,851 8,189 9,687 7,851 
R2 0.138 0.253 0.318 0.333 0.356 0.375 0.388 0.401 0.399 0.417 0.432 
Country N 108 184 107 107 99 103 107 95 99 103 95 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Tertiary Enrolment is calculated at 33.6%, indicating 
the highest enrolment rate in the data set and is 
compared to the outcomes of Democracy (BMR). 
 
The control variables for Table 1 showed high significance, albeit GDP/capita 
loses its significance in Model 9 and Model 11. In addition, among the control 
variables – Property Rights had the strongest direct effect on mertiocratization, 
followed by GDP/capita and Executive Constraints. A comparison between the 
combined coefficient effects of Tertiary Enrolment (%) and Democracy 
(BMR), using Model 3, Model 10 and Model 11, shows that the effect of 
autocratic regimes on meritocratization shifts from positive in Model 3 to 
negative in Model 10-11. Democratic regimes similarly display positive effects 
on meritocratization in Model 3 and retains the positive effect in Model 10-11, 
although weakened. This comparison is illustrated below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The weakened effect among democracies in Model 11 in comparison to Model 
10, may be caused by the fluctuation in observations, which decreases from 
Model 10 to Model 11 by 1,836 observations – corresponding to the exclusion 
of 8 countries.  
Table 2 (see p. 34) illustrates the effect of tertiary enrolment and 
institutionalized democracy on meritocratization. In general terms, the results 
display similar trends as Table 1. The positive effects displayed in Model 1-3 
turn negative in Model 4, where ‘0’ in Institutionalized Democracy shifts the 
coefficient negative. As the models proceeds from Model 4, having ‘0’ 
institutionalized democracy yields negative effects on meritocratization with 
rising rates tertiary enrolment. Conversely, low rates of tertiary enrolment 
together with ‘0’ institutionalized democracy, significantly diminishes the 
negative effects on meritocratization. Higher points of institutionalized 
democracy together with rising tertiary enrolment rates, show strong and 
positive effects on meritocratization in all models. However, the effect is more 
than halved in Model 11 while retaining a significant and positive effect. This 
may again be caused by the loss of observations from Model 10 to Model 11.  
A comparison between the combined coefficient effects of Model 3, Model 10 
and Model 11 is presented on the next page, illustrating the changes in strength 
between the models at hand.  
 Combined Coefficient Effects 
Model  3 10 11 
Autocracy 1.63968 -1.8648 -2.19072 
Democracy 2.64368 1.56724 0.99328 
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Tertiary enrolment is calculated at 33.6, indicating the highest 
enrolment rate in the data set, and is compared to the outcome of the 
lowest (0) and highest (10) scores of institutionalized democracy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar to the prior table, Property Rights in Table 2 has the strongest and most 
significant effect on meritocratization, followed by Regulation of the Chief 
Executive and GDP/capita. However, the issue of fluctuating numbers of 
observations remains. Property Rights and Regulation of Chief Executive 
Recruitment may be differently dimensioned in their effects, as they include 
2,040 further observations in comparison to GDP/capita, corresponding to the 
exclusion of 8 countries. Including all control variables in Model 11, shows 
that GDP/capita loses its significance while the other two controls retain high 
significance. Thus, the diminishing strength of higher institutionalized 
democracy and tertiary enrolment on mertiocratization, may be augmented by 
the varying amounts of observations for each model. In addition, the increased 
negative effect for lower points of institutionalized democracy, combined with 
increasing tertiary enrolment rates, may likewise be augmented for the same 
reason. Thus, although the effects of both directions hold due to the overall 
high numbers of observations, they may have been augmented between Model 
10 and Model 11. This change in effect holds for all Tables (1-3). Thus, the 
effect of Model 10, may illustrate the effects of tertiary enrolment combined 
with the regime typologies presented in this paper with better validity than 
Model 11.  
The following page presents Table 2, displaying the results from the fixed 
effects regression models.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Combined Coefficient Effects 
Model  3 10 11 
Institutionalized Democracy: 0 1.39776 -1.74048 -2.77872 
Institutionalized Democracy: 10 2.78776 1.92592 1.43068 
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Table 2 – The Effect of Tertiary Enrolment on Meritocratization 
 
 
Table 2, includes Institutionalized Democracy as a political regime variable, from the Polity IV Data set. This measurement uses a 0-10 point-scale, where higher scores, indicate 
higher Institutionalized Democracy, while lower scores, indicate an absence of Institutionalized Democracy. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 V-Dem Proxy for Meritocracy 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
            
Tertiary Enrolment (%) 0.0800***  0.0416*** -0.0431 -0.0846*** -0.0280 -0.0679** -0.0782*** -0.0894*** -0.0518* -0.0827** 
 (0.00959)  (0.00957) (0.0260) (0.0292) (0.0252) (0.0296) (0.0292) (0.0317) (0.0285) (0.0315) 
Democracy  0.148*** 0.139*** 0.127*** 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.0839*** 0.0874*** 0.0768*** 0.0592*** 0.0547** 
  (0.0136) (0.0141) (0.0141) (0.0162) (0.0179) (0.0169) (0.0205) (0.0187) (0.0202) (0.0223) 
Democracy × Tertiary Enrolment (%)    0.00988*** 0.0120*** 0.00848*** 0.0107*** 0.0112*** 0.0117*** 0.00915*** 0.0109*** 
    (0.00293) (0.00305) (0.00288) (0.00314) (0.00306) (0.00325) (0.00307) (0.00327) 
GDP/capita, log     0.163*   0.185** 0.110  0.133 
     (0.0861)   (0.0821) (0.0850)  (0.0809) 
Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment      0.262*  0.238*  0.287** 0.251** 
      (0.135)  (0.129)  (0.119) (0.122) 
Property Rights       1.605***  1.318*** 1.629*** 1.331*** 
       (0.362)  (0.372) (0.365) (0.374) 
Constant -0.00281 -0.398*** -0.467*** -0.379*** -1.440** -0.445*** -1.056*** -1.671** -1.626** -1.138*** -1.871*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0503) (0.0619) (0.0657) (0.677) (0.0689) (0.167) (0.642) (0.658) (0.172) (0.628) 
            
Observations 13,348 15,215 10,129 10,129 8,089 10,129 10,129 8,089 8,089 10,129 8,089 
R2 0.138 0.252 0.334 0.352 0.388 0.360 0.402 0.394 0.421 0.411 0.428 
Country N 108 173 104 104 96 104 104 96 96 104 96 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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  Marginal Effects of Tertiary Enrolment on Meritocratization of Model 10 and Model 11 
 
 
The top figure illustrates Model 10. Significant positive effects are observed when the 
Institutionalized Democracy measure reaches 7-10. Institutionalized Democracy displays negative 
relationship with merit in practice for lower points. However, the marginal effects vary between both 
positive and negative values for all points on the scale where negative effects are displayed. The 
below figure illustrates Model 11. Having 0-4 on the Institutionalized Democracy point-scale, 
displays significant and negative effects on meritocratization. Significant positive effects are only 
observed when Institutionalized Democracy reaches 10. Thus, having less institutionalized 
democracy displays increasing negative effects for merit in practice, whereas higher 
institutionalized democracy displays increasing positive effects. 
 
The figures below, illustrate the marginal effects of Model 10 and Model 11 in 
Table 2. Model 11 weakens the strength of higher institutionalized democracy, 
while increasing the negative effect of less institutionalized democracy in 
comparison to Model 10. These shifts in strength may yet again be caused by 
a significant decrease in observations in Model 11.  
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Tertiary Enrolment is calculated at 33.6, indicating the highest 
enrolment rate in the data set, and is compared to the outcome of 
the lowest (0) and highest (10) scores of institutionalized autocracy. 
 
Table 3 (see p. 38) evaluates the effect of tertiary enrolment and 
institutionalized autocracy on meritocratization. Model 2 illustrates a 
significant negative effect on meritocratization with higher institutionalized 
autocracy. Model 3 similarly displays significant negative effects, albeit 
increasing tertiary enrolment rates shifts this trend toward a positive effect. 
Beginning from Model 4 and onward, the results display that higher 
institutionalized autocracy together with rising rates of tertiary enrolment have 
a significant negative effect on meritocratization. What is notable among the 
control variables is that the Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment shows 
the most significant and strong measures on meritocratization, followed by the 
Property Rights variable and GDP/capita. However, the effects are augmented 
in Model 11, which may be caused by a decrease in observations in the same 
model. This shift from Model 10 to Model 11 is observed in the table below, 
illustrating how a fully institutionalized autocracy almost double its negative 
effect on meritocratization, whereas the absence of institutionalized autocracy 
has its positive effect on meritocratization decreased by more than half. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This shift in the effect from Model 10 and Model 11 is illustrated on the next 
page, and is then followed by the presentation of Table 3, illustrating the results 
from the fixed effects model. This is followed by the next section, which 
concludes the results presented here, using previous literature and theories to 
explain the outcome of the fixed effects regression models. 
 
 
 Combined Coefficient Effects 
Model  3 10 11 
Institutionalized Autocracy: 0 1.76064 1.23312 0.588 
Institutionalized Autocracy: 10 0.47064 -2.94148 -5.411 
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Marginal Effects of Tertiary Enrolment on Meritocratization of Model 10 and Model11 
 
 
The top figure, displays the marginal effects for Model 10. Lower points of institutionalized 
autocracy, have a positive and significant effect on meritocratization when tertiary enrolment 
increases. Points between 4-10 indicate an increasing negative effect on meritocratization, albeit 
the marginal effects vary between both positive and negative values for all points on the scale, 
displaying negative effects. The below figure illustrates the marginal effects for Model 11, showing 
significant negative effects from 4-10 on the point-scale. An increase in institutionalized 
autocracy, conjointly with rising tertiary enrolment increases the negative effect on 
meritocratization. Conversely, lower autocratic institutionalization together with increasing rates 
of tertiary enrolment, diminishes the negative effect on meritocratization. The absence of 
institutionalized autocracy thereby shows positive effects, albeit without any significance  
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Table 3 – The Effect of Tertiary Enrolment on Meritocratization 
 
 
Table 3, uses the Institutionalized Autocracy variable as a political regime measure. This measurement uses an eleven-point-scale (0-10), where higher scores indicate higher 
autocratic institutionalization. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 V-Dem Proxy for Meritocracy 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
            
Tertiary Enrolment (%) 0.0800***  0.0524*** 0.0610*** 0.0253** 0.0593*** 0.0371*** 0.0239** 0.0187 0.0367*** 0.0175 
 (0.00959)  (0.00958) (0.00919) (0.0119) (0.00892) (0.00965) (0.0114) (0.0119) (0.00921) (0.0113) 
Autocracy  -0.134*** -0.129*** -0.108*** -0.0920*** -0.0813*** -0.0666*** -0.0699*** -0.0660*** -0.0445** -0.0455** 
  (0.0148) (0.0157) (0.0163) (0.0178) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0200) (0.0195) (0.0202) (0.0215) 
Autocracy × Tertiary Enrolment (%)    -0.0186*** -0.0230*** -0.0127*** -0.0164*** -0.0198*** -0.0195*** -0.0111** -0.0165*** 
    (0.00460) (0.00451) (0.00443) (0.00495) (0.00432) (0.00512) (0.00480) (0.00496) 
GDP/capita, log     0.269***   0.270*** 0.191**  0.193** 
     (0.0816)   (0.0778) (0.0885)  (0.0833) 
Property Rights      0.468***  0.338***  0.419*** 0.323*** 
      (0.131)  (0.114)  (0.120) (0.112) 
Regulation of Chief Executive Recruitment       1.749***  1.252*** 1.664*** 1.225*** 
       (0.361)  (0.383) (0.357) (0.386) 
Constant -0.00281 0.671*** 0.539*** 0.515*** -1.516** 0.141 -0.564** -1.795*** -1.691** -0.846*** -1.952*** 
 (0.0227) (0.0580) (0.0575) (0.0549) (0.673) (0.121) (0.233) (0.640) (0.676) (0.249) (0.654) 
            
Observations 13,348 15,215 10,129 10,129 8,089 10,129 10,129 8,089 8,089 10,129 8,089 
R2 0.138 0.181 0.289 0.313 0.381 0.344 0.376 0.396 0.411 0.400 0.424 
Country N 108 173 104 104 96 104 104 96 96 104 96 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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6 Conclusion 
The results from the previous section, illustrate that increasing rates of tertiary 
enrolment have a significant negative effect on meritocratization – among 
autocratic regimes. Conversely, rising rates of tertiary enrolment increases the 
propensity for meritocratization – among democratic regimes. Furthermore, 
institutionalized democracies have a significant positive effect on 
meritocratization, while institutionalized autocracies have a negative impact 
on meritocratization.  
The first hypothesis (H1) suggests that an increasingly educated population, 
may trigger a competition with the political elite in autocracies over positions 
within the public administration. As the risk of losing influence over political 
affairs increases, it disincentivizes the ruling elite to adopt merit in practice 
(Shefter, 1977, 1993; Sundell, 2013, 2014). Evidence is thereby found for this 
claim among autocracies. The second hypothesis (H2) suggests that 
democracies may display a positive effect on mertiocratization as tertiary 
enrolment increases. This mechanism is proposed, as democratic rulers are 
concerned about the provision of public goods, and are in turn willing to 
sacrifice their natural inclination toward favouring their core constituencies – 
as costs for retaining patronage networks increases with a growing educated 
class. The ruling elites in autocracies, thereby display less willingness to 
meritocratize than the political elites in democracies as tertiary enrolment rises.  
Previous research theorizes that an increase in secondary enrolment, puts 
pressure on the ruling elite to meritocratize as opportunity costs rises (Hollyer, 
2011a, 2011b). An increasingly educated class, may thus pressure the ruling 
elite to change the foundations of recruitment – from informal and partial 
practices characterized by patronage and nepotism – to formal and impartial 
practices signified by merit in practice. The results illustrate that this 
mechanism may fit for democracies – albeit not for autocracies. First, 
according to the results, political regimes seem to have divergent institutional 
characteristics, which in turn impacts the time horizon of the political elite 
differently (Clague et al., 1996).  
One possible explanation may be that the mechanisms for political 
legitimacy widely diverges. The dilemma of meritocratization on one hand, is 
that while autocracies may have the capacity to forcefully implement merit in 
practice (D’Arcy, Nistotskaya and Ellis, 2015) – they are limited to act due to 
the inherent nature of their support, compromising of regime loyalists. This 
condition compels the ruling elite to maintain the patronage networks in place. 
Autocratic regimes thereby have inherent difficulties to meritocratize, as a 
critical foundation of its legitimacy is bounded by the distribution of power 
and public goods to its regime supporters – as a strategy for regime survival. 
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This institutionalized design within autocratic regimes, implicates an inherent 
shorter time-horizon among the ruling elite in autocracies, as the fear for 
regime-breakdown may be greater than in democracies when education 
enrolment increases.  
This suggestion may be underlined by the historical cases of Sweden and the 
United Kingdom on one hand, illustrating that merit adoption only was 
accepted as long as the dominance of the aristocracy was ensured (Sundell, 
2013, 2014; Greenaway, 2004; Horton, 2006). The case of Spain under 
Francisco Franco displays similar patterns, as tertiary enrolment rates were low 
when efforts to meritocratize were initiated (Lapuente, 2007). The timing of 
merit adoption, may have had an important role for the willingness of the ruling 
elite to meritocratize, as the state-formation in Western- and Northern Europe 
succeeded to lock in toward a path of merit reforms – during autocratic rule – 
and before tertiary enrolment rates had increased beyond higher rates.  
The case of Iran on the other hand, shows that improvements of 
mertiocratization may deteriorate quickly if the ruling elite decides that it may 
threaten its political hegemony (Milani, 2010; Tahmasebi-Birgani, 2010; 
Dabashi, 2011). In fact, increasing educational equality between the lower 
classes and the political elite in autocracies, may threaten the positions of the 
elite to such an extent that these patronage networks get further entrenched, 
and in turn pushes merit in practice further away. To quote Thomas Hobbes:  
 
"Nature had made men equal. The weakest has strength 
enough to kill the strongest, and as to the faculties of 
mind find a yet greater equality amongst men than that 
of strength. From this equality arises equality of hope 
in attaining of our ends. And therefore, if two men 
desires the same thing, they become enemies and 
endeavour to destroy and subdue one another” 
(Hobbes, 1651/1985: 183-184). 
 
Here he tells us something that we may not want to hear, that in fact 
educational equality can be interpreted as the reason for social conflict rather 
than the solution for it. While this paper found evidence that it may not be the 
case for democracies – it seems this mechanism proves right for autocratic 
regimes. 
On the other hand, the dilemma for meritocratization among democracies, 
was suggested to lie in their inefficiency to carry out policies due low 
decisiveness (Lapuente, 2007). However, the disposition towards an 
increasingly educated population among the political elite in democracies, 
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differs from the attitudes of the elite in autocracies. Democracies may 
meritocratize as the system is dependent on the support of the general public, 
and thus adopts merit in practice in order to preserve its legitimacy – by 
delivering meritocratic recruitment as a public good.  Democracies do not have 
the same space to ignore an increasing educated workforce, and thus the costs 
for retaining the existing patronage networks rises with increased educational 
enrolment (Holliyer, 2011a). This implies that the demands of a rising 
educated class may be better received by democratic regimes, as they become 
significant part of the electorate. While previous literature contests that the 
input-side bears little significance on bureaucratic governance in general and 
meritocratization in particular (Lapuente and Nistotskaya, 2009; D’Arcy and 
Nistotskaya; 2015) – these results contrarily show that the long-term effects of 
the input-side have important consequences for meritocratization.  
In contrast to democracies, autocratic regimes manage to avert increasing 
pressures arising from higher rates of tertiary enrolment – as they are more 
concerned about their support from regime loyalist than the general public. 
Thus: the survival of the regime comes first, meritocratization later. The 
political elite in autocracies thereby have higher motivations for resisting merit 
in practice when tertiary enrolment rates increase, as the strategy for preserving 
their political hegemony lies with their supporters, which in turn are rewarded 
through recruitment-procedures based on patronage and nepotism (Przeworski 
et al, 2000; Wright, 2008a; Wilson and Wright, 2015).  
In addition, the results illustrated in Table 3, shows that the Regulation of 
Chief Executive Recruitment measure has a significantly strong and positive 
effect on meritocratization in an autocratic setting. Having a wide time-horizon 
in autocracies may thus likely coincide with how well the regulation of the 
chief executive is institutionalized. This evidence relates to the theorization 
that executive constraints sets the foundation for a professionalized 
bureaucracy (Finer, 1997; Teorell, 2017). The evidence in this paper thereby 
points toward a generalization of the suggestion, which was mainly formulated 
for the Monarchical Autocracies in the 18th, 19th and early 20th century (c.f. 
Finer, 1997; Rothstein, 2011a, 2011b; Teorell, 2017).  
Further testing of the hypotheses may be conducted in the following ways. 
First, using more refined variables where a wider variety of democratic and 
autocratic regime types are outlined, may improve the results on the input-side. 
This may complement the results, showing whether there are certain types of 
democracies or autocracies that further facilitate or inhibit merit in practice as 
tertiary enrolment increases. Second, a geographical control may add an extra 
dimension to the analysis. Such a dimension, may for instance test varying 
effects between how democracies in Western Europe interact with education 
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and meritocracy vis-à-vis the democracies of Eastern Europe. In other words, 
it may uncover diverging and converging patterns depending on the 
geographical region. For instance, if geographical variations set democracies 
apart in regards of the likelihood of adopting merit in practice, further causes 
for meritocratization may be detected.  
A third possible alley for future research may include whether gender have 
any effect; how does the ratio between male and female tertiary enrolment 
impact the likelihood of merit in practice over time? As previous studies have 
shown that gender has an important effect on governance (Teigen and 
Wängerud, 2009; Rothstein, 2016), the share of male and female enrollers 
should be explored. A suggestion would therefore be to measure how the 
propensity for meritocratization changes, depending on the rate of female and 
male enrollers. Four, while this study used country-level data, future studies 
may be conducted using regional or sub-regional data over time. The strength 
of such studies is that the hypotheses of this paper can test the internal 
variations of an individual country, displaying whether H1 and H2 may hold 
true for certain regions or the whole country per se. This may as in the case of 
adding geographical layer, point to unexpected factors explaining what causes 
meritocratic recruitment, depending on the variation found among certain 
regions or sub-regions.  
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Appendix I 
 
 
 
 
 Distribution of the Main Dependent Variable – V-Dem Proxy for Meritocracy 
 
The distribution of the main dependent variable is bell-shaped, but slightly skewed to the left. This 
may be expected as all observations are coded over a long period of time (1789-2017), when weaker 
institutions and governance prevailed the farther one goes back in time. The overall distribution is 
considered normal for conducting a statistical analysis. 
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Appendix II 
 
 
 
 
     Distribution of Tertiary Enrolment (%)
The distribution of one of the main independent variables – Tertiary Enrolment (%) – is heavily skewed 
to the left. This may be expected as all observations are coded over a long period of time (1820-2010), 
when tertiary education was still not prevalent. A large portion of the values lie between the 0-1%, with 
fewer observations between 10%-33.6%.  
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The Combined Coefficient Effects of Tertiary Enrolment (%) and Democracy (BMR) on Meritocratization  
 
 
This table shows the combined effect of Tertiary Enrolment (%) and Democracy (BMR) on Meritocratziation from Table 3. This table 
covers the combined effect of the coefficients of Tertiary Enrolment (%) and Democracy (BMR) from Model 3 to Model 11 – as these 
models include both variables. No interaction effect is included in Model 3. Model 4 includes an interaction effect without adding 
controls, and is retained as a baseline for all subsequent models. Model 5-7 adds controls individually. Model 8-10 adds a combination 
of two controls for each model. Model 11 adds all controls.  
 
 
Appendix III 
 
 
 
 
Model 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
Democracy (BMR): 0 
 
Tertiary Enrolment (%): 1 
 
 
0.0488 
 
 
-0.0154 
 
 
-0.0537 
 
 
-0.0306 
 
 
-0.0482 
 
 
-0.0669 
 
 
-0.0548 
 
 
-0.0555 
 
 
-0.0652 
 
Democracy (BMR): 0 
 
Tertiary Enrolment (%): 33.6 
 
 
1.63968 
 
 
-0.51744 
 
 
-1.80432 
 
 
-1.02816 
 
 
-1.61952 
 
 
-2.24784 
 
 
-1.84128 
 
 
-1.8648 
 
 
-2.19072 
 
Democracy (BMR): 1 
 
Tertiary Enrolment (%): 1 
 
 
1.0528 
 
 
0.953 
 
 
0.7661 
 
 
0.482 
 
 
0.5819 
 
 
0.3129 
 
 
0.513 
 
 
0.2339 
 
 
0.1848 
 
Democracy (BMR): 1 
 
Tertiary  Enrolment (%) 33.6 
 
 
2.64368 
 
 
2.8764 
 
 
1.74736 
 
 
2.3402 
 
 
1.88264 
 
 
1.25504 
 
 
1.328 
 
 
1.56724 
 
 
0.99328 
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The Combined Coefficient Effects of Tertiary Enrolment (%) and Institutionalized Democracy on Meritocratization  
 
 
 
 
Model 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
Institutionalized Democracy: 0 
 
Tertiary Enrolment (%): 1 
 
 
0.0416 
 
 
-0.0431 
 
 
 
-0.0846 
 
 
-0.0280     
 
 
-0.0679 
 
 
-0.0782 
 
 
-0.0894 
 
 
-0.0518 
 
 
-0.0827 
 
Institutionalized Democracy: 0 
 
Tertiary Enrolment (%) 33.6% 
 
 
1.39776 
 
 
-1.44816 
 
 
-2.84256 
 
 
-0.9408 
 
 
-2.28144 
 
 
-2.62752 
 
 
-3.00384 
 
 
-1.74048 
 
 
-2.77872 
 
Institutionalized Democracy: 10 
 
Tertiary Enrolment (%): 1 
 
 
1.4316 
 
 
1.3257 
 
 
1.1154 
 
 
1.1068 
 
 
0.8781 
 
 
0.9078 
 
 
0.7956 
 
 
0.6317 
 
 
0.5733 
 
Institutionalized Democracy: 10 
 
Tertiary Enrolment (%) 33.6% 
 
 
2.78776 
 
 
3.14152 
 
 
2.269442 
 
 
2.95848 
 
 
2.15276 
 
 
2.07168 
 
 
3.9312 
 
 
1.92592 
 
 
1.43068 
This table shows the combined effect of Tertiary Enrolment (%) and Institutionalized Democracy on Meritocratziation from Table 3. 
This table covers the combined effect of the coefficients of Tertiary Enrolment (%) and Institutionalized Democracy from Model 3 to 
Model 11 – as these models include both variables. No interaction effect is included in Model 3. Model 4 includes an interaction effect 
without adding controls, and is retained as a baseline for all subsequent models. Model 5-7 adds controls individually. Model 8-10 
adds a combination of two controls for each model. Model 11 adds all controls.  
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The Combined Coefficients Effects of Tertiary Enrolment (%) and Institutionalized Autocracy on Meritocratization  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
Institutionalized Autocracy: 0 
 
Tertiary Enrolment (%): 1 
 
 
0.0524 
 
 
0.0610 
 
 
0.0253 
 
 
0.0593 
 
 
0.0371 
 
 
0.0239 
 
 
0.0187 
 
 
0.0367 
 
 
0.0175 
 
Institutionalized Autocracy: 0 
 
Tertiary Enrolment (%) 33.6% 
 
 
1.76064 
 
 
2.0496 
 
 
0.85008 
 
 
1.99248 
 
 
1.24656 
 
 
0.80304 
 
 
0.62832 
 
 
1.23312 
 
 
0.588 
 
Institutionalized Autocracy: 10 
 
Tertiary Enrolment (%): 1 
 
 
-1.2376 
 
 
-1.205 
 
 
-1.1247 
 
 
-0.8807 
 
 
-0.7929 
 
 
-0.8731 
 
 
-0.8363 
 
 
 
-0.5193 
 
 
-0.6025 
 
Institutionalized Autocracy: 10 
 
Tertiary Enrolment (%) 33.6% 
 
 
0.47064 
 
 
-5.28 
 
 
-7.79792 
 
 
-3.08772 
 
 
-4.92984 
 
 
-6.54876 
 
 
-6.58368 
 
 
-2.94148 
 
 
-5.411 
This table shows the combined effect of Tertiary Enrolment (%) and Institutionalized Autocracy on Meritocratziation from Table 3. 
This table covers the combined effect of the coefficients of Tertiary Enrolment (%) and Institutionalized Autocracy from Model 3 to 
Model 11 – as these models include both variables. No interaction effect is included in Model 3. Model 4 includes an interaction 
effect without adding controls, and is retained as a baseline for all subsequent models. Model 5-7 adds controls individually. Model 
8-10 adds a combination of two controls for each model. Model 11 adds all controls.  
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Appendix IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
List of Matched Countries for Year 2010: Tertiary Enrolment and Meritocracy 
1. Mexico 29. South Korea 57. Malawi 85. Czech Republic 
2. Sweden 30. Philippines 58. Morocco 86. Denmark 
3. Switzerland 31. Taiwan 59. Netherlands 87. Fiji 
4. Ghana 32. Thailand 60. Panama 88. Finland 
5. South Africa 33. Uganda 61. Sierra Leone 89. Greece 
6 Japan 34. Venezuela 62. Spain 88. Guyana 
7. Burma/Myanmar 35. Benin 63. Syria 89. Hong Kong 
8. Russia 36. Cambodia 64. Tunisia 90. Iceland 
9. Albania 37. Indonesia 65. Turkey 91. Kuwait 
10. Egypt 38. Mozambique 66. United Kingdom 92. Luxembourg 
11. Yemen 39. Nepal 67. Uruguay 93. Malaysia 
12. Colombia 40. Nicaragua 68. Algeria 94. Mauritius 
13. Poland 41. Niger 69. Cameroon 95. New Zealand 
14. Brazil 42. Zambia 70. China 96. Norway 
15. United States of America 43. Zimbabwe 71. Dominican Republic 97. Paraguay 
16. Portugal 44. Canada 72. Gambia 98. Romania 
17. El Salvador 45. Australia 73. Jamaica 99. Serbia 
18. Bangladesh 46. Chile 74. Libya 100. Hungary 
19. Bolivia 47. Costa Rica 75. Sri Lanka  
20. Honduras 48 Ecuador 76. Swaziland  
21. Mali 49. France 77. Togo  
22. Pakistan 50. Germany 78. Trinidad and Tobago  
23. Peru 51. Guatemala 79. Austria  
24. Senegal 52. Iran 80. Barbados  
25. Sudan 53. Ireland 81. Belgium  
26. Argentina 54. Italy 82. Bulgaria  
27. India 55. Jordan 83. Cuba  
28. Kenya 56. Lesotho 84. Cyprus  
This figure illustrates the list of countries, when the Tertiary Enrolment (%) and the Rigorous and Impartial Administration 
measure are matched for year 2010. An additional 8 countries were matched for the entire period of 1820 to 2010, and have 
at the ending-year disrupted as country-entities.   
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Appendix V 
 
 
 
Table 4 – The Effect of Secondary Enrolment on Meritocratization  
 V-Dem Proxy for Meritocracy 
VARIABLES 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
            
Secondary Enrolment (%) 0.0275***  0.0155*** -0.00203 -0.0220** -0.00558 -0.0120* -0.0236*** -0.0245*** -0.0129** -0.0252*** 
 (0.00402)  (0.00370) (0.00756) (0.00913) (0.00699) (0.00663) (0.00844) (0.00805) (0.00618) (0.00761) 
Democracy  1.233*** 0.989*** 0.832*** 0.655*** 0.384*** 0.531*** 0.225 0.439*** 0.198 0.118 
  (0.131) (0.111) (0.124) (0.131) (0.137) (0.125) (0.146) (0.127) (0.136) (0.139) 
Democracy × Secondary Enrolment (%)    0.0221*** 0.0289*** 0.0247*** 0.0226*** 0.0302*** 0.0253*** 0.0242*** 0.0269*** 
    (0.00775) (0.00799) (0.00729) (0.00729) (0.00717) (0.00768) (0.00708) (0.00710) 
GDP/capita, log     0.275***   0.274*** 0.225***  0.232*** 
     (0.0861)   (0.0877) (0.0840)  (0.0863) 
Executive Constraints      0.140***  0.133***  0.117*** 0.108*** 
      (0.0306)  (0.0347)  (0.0283) (0.0325) 
Property Rights       1.765***  1.584*** 1.532*** 1.325*** 
       (0.378)  (0.418) (0.356) (0.376) 
Constant -0.0484 -0.288*** -0.297*** -0.211*** -2.139*** -0.615*** -0.993*** -2.533*** -2.522*** -1.238*** -2.780*** 
 (0.0343) (0.0445) (0.0542) (0.0660) (0.690) (0.111) (0.195) (0.695) (0.677) (0.198) (0.663) 
            
Observations 13,348 15,410 10,137 10,137 8,189 9,687 10,137 7,851 8,189 9,687 7,851 
R2 0.130 0.253 0.303 0.317 0.356 0.357 0.371 0.399 0.397 0.398 0.428 
Country N 108 184 107 107 99 103 107 95 99 103 95 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Table 4 uses Democracy (BMR) as a political regime variable, where the reference category denotes autocratic regimes. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
